A Vision of United India

Chapter 7

The present situation in the subcontinent

Let us see the role of the Pakistan Army after the September 11 attacks.

Here are a few extracts from some journals:

The September 11 attacks on New York and Washington and the ensuing U.S.-led war on terrorism have given Pakistan's military dictator, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, an opportunity to improve relations between Washington and Islamabad. That relationship had experienced a steep decline in the 1990s, as the end of both the Cold War and the common struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan eroded the perception of shared strategic interests. Moreover, while it was losing its strategic significance to the United States, Pakistan was coming under the control of an assertive military-religious nexus that promoted anti-American radical Islamic forces at home and abroad. Since September 11, General Musharraf, whose regime had been the main source of diplomatic and military support for the terrorist Taliban that ruled neighbouring Afghanistan, has portrayed his regime as an ally of Washington in its counter-terrorism campaign. Musharraf, though, headed a military clique that brought an end to his nation's short democratic experience, assisted radical Islamic terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir, pressed for a war with India, advanced Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, and presided over a corrupt and mismanaged economy. Despite that record, he is being hailed by the Bush administration as a "courageous" and "visionary" leader who is ready to reorient his country toward a pro-American position and adopt major political and economic reforms. In exchange for his belated support, Musharraf has been rewarded with U.S. diplomatic backing and substantial economic aid. Musharraf s decision to join the U.S. war on terrorism didn't reflect a structural transformation in Pakistan's policy. It was a result of tactical considerations aimed at limiting the losses that Islamabad would suffer because of the collapse of the friendly Taliban regime in Kabul. Rejecting cooperation with Washington would have provoked American wrath and placed at risk Pakistan's strategic and economic interests in South Asia. Some cooperation between the United States and Pakistan is necessary to wage the war against terrorism, but that cooperation must not evolve into a new long-term strategic alliance. Washington should view Pakistan, with its dictatorship, failed economy, and insecure nuclear arsenal, as a reluctant supporter of U.S. goals at best and as a potential long-term problem at worst.

US think tanks look afresh at India and Pakistan

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M.V.KAMATH

After the September 11 attacks and the massing of a million men on the borders of nuclear-armed India and Pakistan in 2001 there has been an awakening among American think-tanks as to what US role should be vis-a-vis the two major South Asian nations. Two of them, in particular the Asia Society and the Council on Foreign Relations were concerned enough to appoint a Task Force to examine what America's approach to India and Pakistan should be in the given circumstances.

The sixty-member Task Force was headed by three distinguished scholars, two of them former Ambassadors, namely Frank G. Wisner II and Nicholas Platt and the third Dr Marshall Boouton from the private sector. As Co-Directors they had Dennis Kux, a diplomat with vast experience in India and Mahnaz Ispahani.

The report of the Task Force commands attention not only because it reflects the experience and wisdom of men of vast standing but because one can expect it to be taken seriously by the US government itself. Hence its importance. The Task Force is clear about one thing: that consolidating US ties with India, securing a moderate Muslim state in Pakistan, actively encouraging peaceful relations between Pakistan and India, ensuring an Afghanistan where terrorists can never again find shelter, must be US priorities.

What is significant about the Task Force's report is that it labours under no illusions. It does not go too deeply into Indo-US relations, no doubt realising that it may invoke unhappy memories of a conflict-ridden past. What it takes note of is the present. As the report puts it: "Unlike during the Cold War years, US and Indian interests broadly coincide (now). The medium-term policy challenge is to complete the transition from past estrangement through constructive engagement on to genuine partnership".

As the report notes, after four decades of cool ties, Washington and New Delhi are now actively and constructively engaged. The report further notes that as the twenty first century unfolds, India will have one of the world's largest economies and will become an increasingly significant security factor in the Indian Ocean region and in Asia as a whole. As the report sees it, India is "like a giant ocean liner that steams ahead at a slow but steady and generally predictable pace and changes direction only very gradually".

The report, too, is sure of certain things about India, namely, that it will remain democratic, that its economy will make steady if uneven progress, that it will "gradually advance towards great power status" and that "regardless of whether the BJP or Congress holds power in New Delhi, India is likely to find its national interest served by better relations with the United States". Of these, the report is under no

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doubt. The Task Force surely is well-informed. Its advice to both the United States and India, under the circumstances is that they should work to expand political, security, military and intelligence cooperation, intensify both official and non-official dialogue on economic and trade issues and negotiate a trade agreement in services. The Task Force also has specific advice to give to both United States and India. For example, it says that the United States should:

1. Ease restrictions on cooperation with India in the civilian satellite sector,

2. Treat India as a "friendly" country in granting export licences for transfers of defence equipment,

3. Ease restrictions on the export to India of dual-use items that have civilian and military uses and

4. Encourage U.S. foundations, business and scientific and educational institutions to expand efforts to develop cooperative programmes with Indian counterparts.

At the same time, according to the Task Force, India should:

1. Implement domestic economic reforms with greater vigour to promote more rapid growth,

2. Open its economy further in the global market by reducing administrative restrictions and other barriers to foreign trade and investment and

3. Modify policies and reduce administrative restrictions that impede cooperative academic and foundation activities.

Few would challenge the validity of these suggestions made in good faith. By and large, the Task Force's outlook towards India is positive, even appreciative. It notes for example that "despite sharp differences at Cancun", the United States and India share common ground in areas such as services, lowering industrial tariffs and reducing restrictions on agricultural trade.

Indeed it goes further to say that "in dealing with these and related policy issues, it is in the US interest to show continuing sensitivity to India's concerns as a developing country" even while pointing out that it is "in India's interest to avoid taking positions that echo pre-reform ideology".

The Task Force has no quarrel with India's foreign policy either. It notes no doubt with some satisfaction that "longstanding support for non-alignment and intimate security ties with the Soviet Union have lost much of their relevance" and that "in the altered global landscape, New Delhi has sought to improve and broaden relations with as many major power centres as possible, especially, but not exclusively, with the United States".

The Task Force, too, does not seem to be offended at the knowledge that "even though India greatly values improved relations with Washington, it remains uncomfortable with the idea of a single dominant super power". If the Task

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Force has its way, it would see that India gets a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

As its report puts it, "if and when there is a comprehensive restructuring of the Security Council, the United States should be prepared to give serious consideration to India's membership". In sharp contract to its appreciation of India's current status is the Task Force's understanding of the situation in Pakistan. It notes, for instance, that in the fifty-six years since Pakistan became an independent state, "it has not been able to achieve a stable political system". "Neither" says its report, "Pakistan's soldiers nor its politicians have offered honest or competent leadership for any extended period". Its assessment of Pakistan is blunt and sharp.

Says the report: "The country has failed to develop a clear sense of national identity. No elected government has yet completed its term in office; civil service and judicial standards have eroded". The report, too, takes a dim view of the backing that Pakistan has been giving to jehadi groups that are active in "India-administered Kashmir". It is not happy with Pakistan's questionable nuclear dealings either. "For the United States, preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons has the highest priority, yet Pakistan's record of nuclear and ballistic-missile transactions with North Korea suggests a willingness to become involved in the most dangerous kind of nuclear proliferation", the Task Force notes.

One gets the further feeling that the Task Force is not sure that Musharraf will last. As its report says: "it remains to be seen whether Musharraf's political dispensation will prove any more durable than those of Pakistan's earlier rulers". Against this background, what is the advice that the Task Force has to give the US Government in handling Pakistan? As the Task Force sees it, America has a major stake in friendly and long-term ties with Pakistan except that "a positive relationship will be difficult to sustain unless Islamabad firmly turns its back on terrorist groups and plays by non-proliferation rules". The Task Force has specific recommendations to make. It says the United States should:

1. Urge publicly as well as privately, an enhanced civilian and a reduced army role in governance of Pakistan,

2. Oppose continued involvement of the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) Directorate in the electoral process,

3. Provide increased assistance in bolstering civil society.

4. Press Musharraf to make good his pledge to stop infiltration across the Line of Control permanently;

5. Ease restrictions on Pakistani textile imports into the United States,

6. Make education the principal focus of US assistance,

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7. Obtain early Congressional approval for a five-year $3 billion assistance package of which two-thirds is for economic and only one-third is for military use,

8. Make clear that Pakistan's failure to do a better job of preventing the use of its territory by terrorists will reduce US assistance levels.

Importantly, the Task Force says that in order to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan, the United States should stress with Pakistan, the need to:

1. Permanently prevent infiltration across the LoC,

2. Modify its present negotiating stance, which makes progress on Kashmir a precondition for dealing with other India- Pakistan issues.

Will Pakistan ever listen to Washington? Can it afford not to? The fact that Islamabad on its own has offered a ceasefire along the LoC indicates that things are moving. Which is why one has to take the recommendations made by the Asia Society-Council on Foreign Relations Task Force seriously. Perhaps they are an indication of things to come.