A Vision of United India

Part 2

Indo-Pakistan relations after Independence

Chapter 1

The Kashmir problem

In the second part of the book, we shall deal with the actions and strategies of the Government of India after independence. The country was now free but unfortunately divided. It was hoped that this division would be only temporary and provisional. However, the sad part of the whole affair was that the Government of India had accepted the Partition as final and irrevocable. As already seen, at the beginning of this chapter, Sri Aurobindo in his message of Aug.15, August 1947, had warned of the consequences of partition in the following words: "But the old communal division into Hindu and Muslim seems to have hardened into the figure of a permanent political division of the country. It is to be hoped that the Congress and the nation will not accept the settled fact as forever settled or as anything more than a temporary expedient. For if it lasts, India may be seriously weakened, even crippled: civil strife may remain always possible, possible even a new invasion and foreign conquest".

Unfortunately the Government of India, led first by the Congress party and later by other parties, accepted the partition as final and all their policies and strategies have been founded on this plank.

As a consequence, there was no attempt to bring about the unity of India. This only accentuated the problems, which India had to face and is still facing after more than half a century of freedom. We shall see in this section the inevitable and unfortunate errors committed that are the natural consequence of this shortsighted vision that has brought the country to such a difficult situation.

The Kashmir problem

Immediately after Independence, India was faced with the Kashmir problem. The Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, unlike most rulers of other states was dithering and had not taken any decision regarding his State; he hoped to remain independent. He, therefore, sought a 'standstill' agreement with both Pakistan and India. At that time, Sardar Patel sent a message to Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir, through Mountbatten himself, that were he to accede to Pakistan, India would not take it amiss. It is clear that if the Maharaja wanted to accede to India or to Pakistan he could have done so in August 1947 itself. However, the public opinion in Jammu and Kashmir at that time was not in favour of joining Pakistan.

The inner story

On Aug. 24, August 1947, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, weakened by the prolonged pre-partition negotiations, ceremonies to mark the birth of Pakistan and by his lung disease (unknown to the British and Indian political hierarchy) had expressed his desire to take a vacation in Srinagar. His request was turned down by the then Maharaja of J&K, Hari Singh. Though trade along the famous 'silk route' connected Kashmir and Afghanistan, this little known incident started the recent violent connection between these two places. Shocked by this rebuke to the father of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister, convened a secret meeting (unknown to the British officers in the Pakistan administration including General Messervy, the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army) to discuss the future course of action on Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

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During the meeting, the Pakistan Army dismissed the idea of outright invasion as it could lead to a war against their erstwhile comrades in arms for which they were not ready. Two other plans were discussed. The first, outlined by Colonel Akbar Khan, a Sandhurst graduate, involved an uprising of the Kashmiri dissident Muslim population. This plan would entail months of preparation and visualised forty to fifty thousand Kashmiri dissidents descending on Srinagar to force the Maharaja of J&K to cede to Pakistan (this plan was carried out with a few modifications was carried out in 1988-89).

The second plan involved the most troublesome and feared population of the subcontinent, the Pathan (Pashtuns) tribesmen of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). It had become known that agents of the King of Afghanistan were arousing the Pathan (Pashtuns) tribes of NWFP seeking their support for the expansion of his kingdom to Peshawar and the banks of River Indus, leading to the creation of a 'Greater Pashtunistan'. Sending these troublesome tribesmen to Srinagar (J&K) had considerable appeal; it would force the swift fall of the Maharaja and the annexation of the State to Pakistan. In addition, offering tribesmen an opportunity to loot bazaars in Kashmir would keep their covetous eyes off the bazaars of Peshawar.

Major Khurshid Anwar, an officer who had been cashiered from the erstwhile Indian Army for misappropriating Mess funds, was chosen to arouse the emotions and galvanise the Pathans. Known for his volatile character, Anwar met the tribal leaders and tried to arouse their religious passions based on the concept of 'the infidel Maharaja about to join India, leaving millions of Muslim brethren under Hindu rule' (the present galvanization of support for militancy is also based on a similar concept of Muslims suffering under Hindu rule). More than patriotic and religious passion was the promise of loot. Within days and weeks, a call 'Jihad' (holy war) echoed in the tribal areas. Secretly, weapons and supplies were collected at various assembly points from where the crusade was to be launched. To ensure they stay focussed on their aim, a large number of Pakistan Army officers and soldiers in the guise of Pathans were merged with the Lashkars (tribesmen).

The invasion began on Oct. 21 1947. The Pathans killed, raped women and looted bazaars wherever they went. The convent of the Franciscan Missionaries, thousands of Hindu, Sikh and Muslim women and the bazaars of Muzaffarabad, Uri and Baramulla bore testimony to the Pathans' animal instincts and thirst for pillage. Despite the best efforts of the Pakistan Army officers and men to make these Pathans reach Srinagar, they were beaten back by the Indian Army landing at the Srinagar airfield in the early hours of Oct. 27 1947, after the Maharaja of J&K had signed the 'Instrument of Accession'. The defeat of the tribals a few miles outside Srinagar, led to their flight along with the loot and brought the Pakistan Army in direct confrontation with the Indian Army. As the battle raged on for three months, the Indian Army helped regain large tracts of the Jammu and Kashmir State. The officers and men of the two armies, who had parted company only three months ago and vowed to remain brothers in arms against a common foe, seemed to have become enemies forever.

Here is a detailed report on the Kashmir war.

We quote from the official Army report on Kashmir:

"Why did Pakistan invade Kashmir in the first place? First, Kashmir being a Muslim-dominant state was considered a natural part of Pakistan, which had made Islam the basis of its modern nationality. Second, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan's Pathanistan Movement was gaining momentum and Kashmir was held out as a bait for luring the

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poor tribals away. The internal conditions of Jammu & Kashmir with religious passions aflame, lawlessness rampant and authority paralysed offered the right mix for the raiders to strike.

Operation Gulmarg

The Army Headquarters of Pakistan planned the main invasion plan, code-named Operation Gulmarg. Conclusive proof of this came through two different sources -Major Onkar Singh Kalkat, then serving as the Brigade Major at HQ Bannu Frontier Brigade Group, and G.K. Reddy, a journalist. Both happened to stumble upon the plan by chance. The invasion was planned meticulously with considerable strategic and tactical insight. According to Operation Gulmarg, as described by Major Kalkat, every Pathan tribe was required to enlist at least one Lashkar of 1,000 tribesmen. These Lashkars were to be concentrated at Baftnu, Wana, Peshawar, Kohat, Thal and Nowshera by the first week of September 1947. The Brigade Commanders at these places were to issue them arms, ammunition and some essential clothing items. Each Lashkar was also to be provided with a Major, a Captain and ten JCOs of the regular Pakistan Army. The entire force was to be commanded by Major General Akbar Khan, who was given the code name Tariq.

All Lashkars were to meet at Abbottabad by October 18th. According to the plan, six Lashkars were to advance along the main road from Muzaffarabad to Srinagar via Domel, Uri and Baramula, with the specific task of capturing the aerodrome and subsequently advancing to the Banihal Pass. Two Lashkars were to advance from the Haji Pir Pass direct on to Gulmarg, thereby securing the right flank of the main force advancing from Muzaffarabad. Another two Lashkars were to advance from Tithwal through the Nastachhun Pass for capturing Sopore, Handwara and Bandipur. And 10 other Lashkars were to operate in the Poonch, Bhimbar and Rawalkot area with the intention of capturing Poonch and Rajauri before advancing to Jammu. Arrangements were also made for detailing of guides/informers from the so-called Azad Army, to all these tribal Lashkars.

Major General Khan was also given the task of organising the Azad Army, the major portion of which was to come from the Muslim element of the J&K State forces. Dumps of arms, ammunition, supplies and clothing were to be established forward of Abbottabad by October 15th. These were to be subsequently moved to Muzaffarabad and Domel after the D-day. Pakistan's 7 Infantry Division was to concentrate on the Murree-Abbottabad area by October 21st and was ordered to be ready to move immediately into J&K territory to back up the tribal Lashkars and consolidate their hold on the Valley. One infantry brigade was also held in readiness at Sialkot to move on to Jammu. The D-day for Operation Gulmarg was fixed as 22 October 1947, on which date the various Lashkars were to cross into J&K territory. The invasion plan was tactically sound and, in the beginning, brilliantly executed. The main attack had by necessity to be launched frontally along the motor road. Apart from rifles, the standard weapon of the raiders, the main force was also equipped with a few light machine guns and travelled in about 300 civilian lorries.

Between October 22nd and 26th, the raiders had run over Domel, Muzaffarabad, Uri and Baramula. Yet in their success lay the seeds of their doom. For on their way, they took to looting and raping, and the ultimate goal of the 'Holy War' was forgotten. Each man tried to grab as much wealth or as many girls as he could, and the 'infidel' Maharaja at

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Srinagar or the 'liberation of the oppressed Muslims' of Kashmir was last on his mind. The advance on Srinagar was held up for a few days, and that proved crucial. In Delhi, hundreds of kilometres from stricken Baramula, it had at last been decided to save Kashmir in its hour of peril. Even as the barbaric raiders were satisfying their greed and lust in Baramula, transport planes full of Indian troops were winging their way through the azure autumn skies: Destination Srinagar.

Only the impromptu airlift to Srinagar in October 1947 saved the Kashmir Valley. A hundred planes landed every day on the improvised airfield at Srinagar, bringing in troops, ammunition and supplies and evacuating casualties and the refugees. The RIAF and civilian pilots of these Dakotas defied the mountains, the weather, and fatigue, to continue the airlift till the Valley was saved. Giving invaluable support to these were the fearless fighter pilots who accurately and repeatedly attacked vital enemy positions at Gurais, Zoji La, Pindras and Rajouri. Apart from the men in uniform, civilians played a crucial role in liberating the Valley. The dedication and skill of the civilian pilots who flew to Srinagar in October 1947 was no less than their counterparts in the RIAF. Very few know that a civilian washerman, Ram Chander, won a Maha Vir Chakra for rescuing an officer wounded during an ambush, shooting down several enemy troops in the process. It was this Indian spirit and valour that saved the Valley.

India to the Rescue

It was on 24 October 1947 that the Government of India first got news of the Kashmir invasion. By that time, Domel and Muzaffarabad had already fallen to the raiders, who were fast approaching Srinagar. The Maharaja of Kashmir sent an S.O.S. message to the Indian Government on the night of October 24th. After deliberations at the highest levels, it was decided that India couldn't send its troops till J&K formally acceded to India. Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession in the evening of October 26th, which made J&K an integral part of India - legally, morally, and constitutionally. The Indian reaction, from then onwards, was swift, adverse ground conditions notwithstanding.

Operation Jak

The Indian rescue operation was beset with obvious difficulties from the very beginning. Srinagar was over 480 km from the nearest point on the Indian border. Troops in East Punjab were engaged in dealing with the refugees and maintaining law and order. Hence, air transport was the only way out. Worse still, the airport at Srinagar was hardly fit to land fully laden transport planes. But that was the only option available and it had to be taken. The rescue mission was code-named, Operation Jak. The first regiment to move in was 1 Sikh, stationed at Gurgaon at the time and commanded by Lt. Col. D.R. Rai. The troops were transported in four Dakota planes that took off from Delhi on October 27th and reached Srinagar early morning the same day. The first engagement with the enemy started on October 28th. Lt. Col. Rai was the first Indian officer to fall in the battle of liberation.

It was only after the first troops had landed at Srinagar that the gravity of the situation was realised. So, the Indian Army decided to throw its full weight to drive back the invaders. On October 28th, the Delhi and East Punjab Command was ordered to carry out Phase II of Operation Jak. It involved dispatching one Brigade Group to Jammu via Pathankot. The next day, the Eastern and Southern commands were asked to spare whatever troops they could for the operation. Airlifts were undertaken almost round-the-clock

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to increase the troop strength. On October 30th, two fighter aircraft of the RIAF were detailed to operate from the Srinagar airstrip to provide air-support to the ground troops. In the following days, many Harvards and Spitfires were based on that airfield and they gave invaluable support to the infantry.

Meanwhile, there had been some fierce engagements with the enemy on the ground, resulting in some casualties on the Indian side. But most importantly, the advance of the invaders had been checked. The ground troops held the enemy. Transport planes took care of the supply of troops, equipment and ration. Interestingly, apart from three RIAF planes, 33 civil Dakotas were used in these sorties. Many of them even did a double trip to Srinagar on a single day - a tribute to the morale of the pilots and crew. By November 6th, the critical phase for Srinagar was over. The raiders had lost the initiative thanks to their looting at Baramula. About 3500 Indian troops had reached Srinagar by then. They threw a ring of machine guns and bayonets around Srinagar and the airfield. Although the invaders were only about 8 km away from the city at the nearest point, it was now impossible for them to penetrate the Indian positions and capture the capital, almost in their grasp. Having strengthened their position, the Indian Army was about to begin the liberation of the Kashmir valley.

The Liberation of the Valley

According to orders from the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, Baramula was to be recaptured from the enemy by November 17th, even if the Indian Army had to incur 500 casualties. The original plan was to launch the decisive battle on November 10th, but an unexpected attack on Indian positions at Shalateng on November 7th postponed the initiative. In a masterly battle strategy, the Indian troops flanked the invaders from three sides and unleashed murderous firepower on them. The RIAF strafed them from the air. The Battle of Shalateng was over within 20 minutes. It put Srinagar and Kashmir Valley beyond the grasp of the invaders forever. There were encounters after that, but the enemy was being driven back steadily and surely. By the evening of November 13 th, Uri was captured. With that the liberation of the Kashmir Valley was complete".

Summary

When the first wave of tribal warriors from Pakistan invaded the Kashmir Valley on Oct. 22, 1947, the kingdom of Jammu & Kashmir had not acceded to either Pakistan or India. Therefore, taking the plea that it was an internal matter, India refused to send in its troops to the Valley. However, when Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession with the Indian Government on the evening of Oct. 26, 1947, Jammu & Kashmir became an integral part of the Indian Dominion legally, morally and constitutionally. This was the time to react to the tribal invasion, which India did commendably, considering the short notice given to its military commanders.

The first troops were flown to Srinagar with hardly a couple of days of planning and preparation. The liberation of the Valley in early November 1947 was a splendid feat of arms by the 161 Brigade, fighting against hordes of raiders. This single brigade managed to hold its own throughout the long winter of 1947-48 when its only line of communication was blocked by snow. Large areas in the Tithwal, Naushahra and Rajouri sectors were liberated from the invaders, and were held by a vastly superior enemy against repeated attacks. Naturally, the Indian Army also suffered setbacks, minor and major, at several places such as Jhangar, Pandu, Kargil and Skardu. But the situation was fully restored at Jhangar and Kargil. The long siege of Poonch was finally broken and the

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Gurais & Dras areas were successfully recaptured against tremendous odds. The Army won five Param Vir Chakras (PVCs), 47 Maha Vir Chakras (MVCs) and not less than 284 Vir Chakras (VrCs), including three twin-awards of VrCs, during the J&K Operations of 1947-48.

During the long campaign, the Indian Army lost 76 officers, 31 JCOs and 996 men of other ranks. The wounded totalled 3152, including 81 officers and 107 JCOs. Apart from these casualties, the J&K State Forces lost approximately 1990 officers and men. The small Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) lost 32 personnel, including 9 officers. However, the enemy casualties were definitely many times the total of Indian Army and RIAF casualties. By one estimate, the enemy suffered 20,000 casualties, including 6000 killed. The gallantry and skill of all ranks of the Indian Army are amply borne out in the various accounts of these operations. But the exploits and the vital role of the RIAF deserve special mention here. Its contribution to the success of the J&K operations cannot be over emphasized, and it was the one weapon to which the enemy had no answer, as the Pakistan Air Force wisely desisted from joining the fray.

Kashmir's accession to India

On October. 26th 1947, acting on the authority vested in him as the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh abandoned his 'standstill policy' and acceded to India. This has been verified by the UN, which testified that the accession to India was legal and complete. We reproduce the text of the letter dated Oct. 26, 1947, from Hari Singh, Maharaja Of Jammu & Kashmir, to Lord Mountbatten, Governor General of India.

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have to inform your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my State and request immediate assistance of your Government.

As your Excellency is aware the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not acceded to the Dominion of India or to Pakistan. Geographically my State is contiguous to both the Dominions. It has vital economical and cultural links with both of them. Besides my State has a common boundary with the Soviet Republic and China. In their external relations the Dominions of India and Pakistan cannot ignore this fact.

I wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion I should accede, or whether it is not in the best interests of both the Dominions and my State to stand independent, of course with friendly and cordial relations with both.

I accordingly approached the Dominions of India and Pakistan to enter into Standstill Agreement with my State. The Pakistan Government accepted this Agreement. The Dominion of India desired further discussions with representatives of my Government. I could not arrange this in view of the developments indicated below. In fact the Pakistan Government are operating Post and Telegraph system inside the State.

Though we have got a Standstill Agreement with the Pakistan Government that Government permitted steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol to my State. Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with modern weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the State at first in Poonch and then in Sialkot and finally in mass area adjoining Hazara District on the Ramkot side. The result has been that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at the several points simultaneously, that it has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life and property and looting. The Mahora

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powerhouse that supplies the electric current to the whole of Srinagar has been burnt. The number of women who have been kidnapped and raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer Capital of my Government, as first step to over-running the whole State.

The mass infiltration of tribesmen drawn from distant areas of the North-West Frontier coming regularly in motor trucks using Mansehra-Muzaffarabad Road and fully armed with up-to-date weapons cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the Provisional Government of the North-West Frontier Province and the Government of Pakistan. In spite of repeated requests made by my Government no attempt has been made to check these raiders or stop them from coming into my State. The Pakistan Radio even put out a story that Provisional Government had been set up in Kashmir. The people of my State both the Muslims and non-Muslims generally have taken no part at all.

With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation, as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and my people to free-booters. On this basis no civilized Government can exist or be maintained. This alternative I will never allow to happen as long as I am Ruler of the State and I have life to defend my country.

I am also to inform your Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once to set up an interim Government and ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.

If my State has to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar. Mr. Menon is fully aware of the situation and he will explain to you, if further explanation is needed.

In haste and with kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Hari Singh

Below is the text of the Instrument of Accession

The Instrument of Accession

Whereas, the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provided that as from the fifteenth day of August 1947, there shall be set up an independent dominion known as INDIA, and that the Government of India Act, 1935, shall, with such omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications as the Governor-General may by order specify, be applicable to the dominion of India.

And whereas the Government of India Act, 1935, as so adapted by the Governor-General provides that an Indian State may accede to the Dominion of India by an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof.

Now, therefore, I Shriman Indar Mahandar Rajrajeshwar Maharajadhiraj Shri Hari Singhji, Jammu Kashmir Naresh Tatha Tibbet adi Deshadhipathi, Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir State, in the exercise of my sovereignty in and over my said State do hereby execute this my Instrument of Accession and:

I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India with the intent that the Governor-General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any other Dominion

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authority established for the purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State of J&K (hereinafter referred to as this State') such functions as may be vested in them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India, on the 15th day of August 1947 (which Act as so in force in hereafter referred to as "the Act").

I hereby assume the obligation of ensuring that due effect is given to the provisions of the Act within this State so far as they are applicable therein by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession.

I accept the matters specified in the Schedule hereto as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for this State.

I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India on the assurance that if an agreement is made between the Governor-General and the Ruler of this State whereby any functions in relation to the administration in this State of any law of the Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by the Ruler of this State, then any such agreement shall be deemed to form part of this Instrument and shall be construed and have effect accordingly.

The terms of this Instrument of Accession shall not be varied by any amendment of the Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless such amendment is accepted by me by an Instrument supplementary to this Instrument.

Nothing in this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature to make any law for this State authorizing the compulsory acquisition of land for any purpose, but I hereby undertake that should the Dominion for the purposes of a Dominion law which applies in this State deem it necessary to acquire any land, I will at their request acquire the land at their expense or if the land belongs to me transfer it to them on such terms as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement, determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Justice of India.

Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter into arrangements with the Government of India under any such future constitution.

Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my sovereignty in and over this state, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed by me as Ruler of this State or the validity of any law at present in force in this State.

I hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State and that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of the State is to be construed as including a reference to my heirs and successors.

Given under my hand this 26th day of October, Nineteen Hundred and Forty Seven. Acceptance of Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir State by the Governor General of India

I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession.

Dated this Twenty-Seventh day of October Nineteen Hundred and Forty-Seven.

(Sd). Lord Mountbatten Governor General of India

The Indian response

After receiving this letter, the Government of India sent its troops under Lt.Col.D.R.Rai to Kashmir on Oct. 27, 1947, to save Kashmir from Pakistan's invasion, and there was

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widespread jubilation among the citizens of Srinagar and the inhabitants of neighbouring towns and villages. The morale of the people was high and they organized bands of volunteers to maintain law and order and collected all motor vehicles for use by the Indian army. Local drivers were at the wheels ready to risk their lives in defending their motherland.

Within a few days, the major part of Jammu and Kashmir was cleared of the Pakistani invaders. And then came the action from the Government of India, which defies all rational explanation. Just when it seemed that the whole of the State would come under the control of India, the Government of India decided to lodge a complaint against Pakistan in the United Nations. But that was not to be. This action of the Government of India is difficult to explain and the consequence is that the problem of Kashmir is still there like a festering wound.

On Jan. 1, 1948, India complained to the UN Security Council under the provision of Article 35 of the UN Charter. The United Nations took eight months to have the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolution tabled and it was finally done on Aug. 13, 1948. The issue before UN under Article 35 was Pakistan's aggression against India, and not the legality of the Instrument of Accession. The latter has never been questioned by anybody, including UN legal experts, yet even today the world is made to believe that it is the accession that is under dispute!

Let us see the resolution of the United Nations. The UNCIP resolution is as follows:

The UNCIP resolution of AUGUST 13, 1948

Part I - provided for a cease-fire.

Part II - provided for a truce agreement under which Pakistan would accept unconditional withdrawal of its troops, tribesmen, and all unlawful Pakistan nationals from Jammu and Kashmir. Further, this part recognized the necessity of India maintaining an army in Jammu and Kashmir to maintain law and order in the state.

Part III - "The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people, and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement (of Part II), both Governments agree to enter consultations with the Commission (UNCIP) to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured".

India sought a series of clarifications from the UNCIP. After the UNCIP received the final communication from the Governments of India and of Pakistan dated respectively Dec. 23 and 25, 1948, the UNCIP passed another resolution on Jan. 5th, 1949, declaring certain provisions supplementary to the UNCIP resolution of Aug. 13 th, 1948.

The UNCIP resolution of January 5, 1949

Among these supplements was a provision for a Plebiscite Administrator to be nominated by the Secretary General of the UN in consultation with the UNCIP. More importantly, also unambiguous was the fact that the 'consideration of the plebiscite' would come into effect ONLY AFTER the UNCIP would find that "the cease fire and truce arrangements set forth in Parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of August 13, 1948, have been carried out". The UN resolution further required that "all persons who on or since August 15, 1947, have entered the state (of Jammu and Kashmir) for other than lawful purposes shall be required to leave the state".

Furthermore, it should be noted that the UNCIP resolution of Aug.13 1948, stated that the "future status of the State of Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of

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the people", and thereby included the possibility of Jammu and Kashmir becoming independent of both India and Pakistan. Pakistan had this provision reduced, in the UNCIP resolution of January 5, 1949 to "the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan", thereby excluding the possibility of an independent Jammu and Kashmir. Yet, the media in India and all over the world has allowed Pakistan to carry on the propaganda that Pakistan champions the cause of freedom of the people of J&K!

Till today, Parts I and II of the UNCIP resolution of August 13 th, 1948, have never been put into operation. Instead, Pakistan consolidated its aggression. India, instead of evicting the intruders on the spot, kept protesting to the Security Council, that Pakistan should "vacate its aggression".

So far as the cease-fire agreements have been concerned, as is well known, notwithstanding Part I of the said Aug. 13, 1948 UNCIP resolution, Pakistan has signed some, and broken them all, subsequent to several military defeats (most notably in 1965, 1968, 1971 and the latest in 1999).

The plebiscite: How and Why Pakistan avoided it?

Pakistan was NEVER in favour of 'self-determination' of the Kashmiris. Pakistan's claim to have supported Kashmiris' self- rule is manifestly refuted by the stand it has taken. All evidence is essentially to the contrary. Pakistan wanted, following the outdated tactics of the Moguls, to coerce the Kashmiris to accede to it. Every time the UN came close to organizing a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan raised difficulties and actually avoided the plebiscite.

Pakistan had to avoid the plebiscite because it realized that the Kashmiris, had suffered an enormous loss of human dignity at its hands, and would not vote to accede to it. Pakistan hoped that it could put off the plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir till there was sufficient illegal Pakistani infiltration, which would offset the popular choice in the state. Pakistan's policy was manifestly simple and malicious: First and foremost - disregard democracy. Further, coerce people into saying what it wanted them to say and pass it off as 'popular people's mandate'. Pakistan employed the strategy of accepting and consolidating what they got, and asking for more and more, just as Jinnah had done previously.

The instrument of accession of Jammu and Kashmir accepted by the Government of India was the very same as for all other princely states. The accession was thus complete in law and in fact, and made the State of Jammu and Kashmir an integral part of India. There was simply no popular support to Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir: how could the very same people against whom Pakistan committed atrocities actually want to join it? Philip Talbot wrote in 'World Politics, No 3, April 1949, of 'the tenacious resistance against Jinnah and Pakistan by Kashmir's largest political party, the Kashmir National Conference, which was Muslim led (by Sheikh Abdullah) and largely Muslim supported.' Pakistan's strategy was, therefore, to avoid plebiscite till it manipulated the demography of the region. This would be done over ten, twenty, thirty, fifty, years - as many as it would take, till the demography of the region had been manoeuvred by forcing Indians out of the state, through terror and malice, and replacing them by illegal infiltration. This would be done till the result of a plebiscite would be in Pakistan's favour. Pakistan repeatedly raised problems regarding demilitarisation of the region required as a precondition

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to the plebiscite by the UN resolution, so that it could actually stall the plebiscite even as it kept demanding it! Pakistan is still continuing with this very game plan, and all the Governments of India have let it go on.

In May 1951, Yuvraj Karan Singh issued a proclamation convoking a CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY on the basis of free adult franchise, elections to which were held in October 1951. Correspondents and observers who came personally to witness the elections, reported upon these elections across the world.

On Apr. 30, 1951, the UN appointed Dr. Frank D. Graham as an arbitrator. Pakistan was claiming Jammu and Kashmir on the grounds that it was predominantly Muslim, but it failed to assess the strength of secularism that has been at the very heart of the Indian tradition. Several Muslim leaders supported Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India. In a Memorandum submitted on Aug. 14 1951, by fourteen prominent Indian Muslim leaders to the UN, the petitioners clearly spelt out how Pakistan did not consider the well being of the Muslim community at large. This memorandum deplored Pakistan's attitude toward the Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir and expressed confidence in India's will and ability to safeguard Muslim interests. This memorandum is one of the countless expressions of solidarity of the Muslim community to the interests of India, and has been in consonance with the rich, secular traditions of modern India. Sheikh Abdullah and Maulana Azad were not the only Muslims who understood the fact that India was not automatically a 'Hindu state in imbalance' just because Jinnah had declared Pakistan to be a Muslim State.

Disgusted with Pakistan's continued evasion and non-cooperation on the plebiscite, Dr. Graham asked for extra time on Oct. 15, 1951, and then on Jan. 17, 1952, he admitted failure!

On Aug. 7, 1952, Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, declared in the parliament of India: "Jammu and Kashmir's accession was complete in law and in fact... It is patent and no argument is required because the accession of every (princely) state in India was complete on these very terms. When the United Nations Commission accompanied by legal advisors and others came here, it was open to them to challenge it. But they did not."

On Feb. 6th, 1954, the constituent assembly unanimously confirmed the 'Instrument of Accession'. The will of the people was ascertained in the highest of democratic traditions. What more is required to establish popular mandate?

Pakistan continued to take the issue to the UN and kept pressing for a plebiscite even while evading it. Finally in 1964, at the UN Security Council meeting, India's brilliant representative, M.C. Chagla declared: "Jammu and Kashmir became an integral part of India... You cannot make more complete what is already complete... The two basic UN resolutions of 1948 and 1949 were conditional and contingent on Pakistan vacating its aggression and the condition has not been complied with.... The basis having disappeared, these resolutions are no longer binding on us... The only people who continued to suffer were the people of Kashmir for whom Pakistan felt no care...the resolutions of the UNCIP had lapsed, and under no circumstances would India agree to a plebiscite which Pakistan repeatedly avoided."

Finally, the UN Security Council debate ended, with the President of the Security Council stating, on May 18, 1964, "the negotiations between India and Pakistan might be

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complicated by any outside intervention". USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union asked for a bilateral settlement instead of UN involvement.

The US representative to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, said: "the Kashmir question should be peacefully resolved.... We urged bilateral talks between the parties last year. An agreement cannot be imposed from the outside." This was reported by the President of the USA, while reporting to the U.S. Congress on events in 1964 on 'Our participation in he UN' (US State Dept. Publication 7943, released Feb. 1966, pp.63-70).

Conclusion

The legality, completeness and irrevocability of Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India was firmly established, but India failed to consolidate Jammu and Kashmir's integration due to a temporary measure of dubious value and devastating consequences, that was taken then.

There are several lessons to be learnt from the events of 1947 - the most important being that it is the leadership of a nation, which determines the course of history, and that national security can be defended and protected only by that nation itself. This is as true today as it was in 1947. National security was given the go by when Nehru listened to Mountbatten rather than to Sardar Patel and ran to the UN to do his work for him while national integration was achieved and strengthened because Sardar Patel relied on nothing but his own courage and counsel and faith in his own destiny.

The events which led up to December 1947 are well recorded and do not warrant repetition. Suffice it to say that after India won the Battle of Shatlang, after Baramulla was recaptured from the marauding Pakistani hordes, and after our troops had reached the heights of Uri, all that remained to be done was for our troops to move into Pakistan and deliver the ultimate, punitive blow for daring to invade Indian Territory. The GOI did indeed warn Pakistan on Dec. 22nd, December, 1947, that it would move into Pakistan if Pakistan did not forthwith cease to wage this terrorist war in J&K. Gandhi too is reported to have written to Atlee asking Britain to restrain Pakistan from embarking on this destructive path but Mountbatten and Nehru's arrogance changed India's course of history.

Pakistan was created by the British not only as a puppet state of strategic geo-political importance in Asia to protect the West's interests in oil in the middle east but also as a permanent lever with which to check India; and Kashmir was meant to be the proverbial thorn in India's flesh. The British government had everything to gain in keeping the tensions running high between India and Pakistan via J&K. The British government, therefore, could not afford to have India moving into Pakistan and crushing it nor could it afford to be drawn forcibly into a situation where it would be compelled to deal firmly with Pakistan.

It was at this very crucial moment in India's history that Mountbatten dissuaded Nehru from attacking Pakistan and instead persuaded him to approach the UN to deal with Pakistan's transgression. This effectively succeeded in keeping the problem of J&K unresolved. And it has remained unresolved till today because the Government of India has not applied its mind to free itself from the legal tangle it has created for itself and its ineptitude in dealing with the international community. The gratuitous interference of the UN with the Pakistanis lurking sinisterly in the background has further debilitated this country's will to resolve the problem firmly and with its own strength.

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Nehru decided, on Mountbatten's advice, and to India's eternal shame and misfortune, to lodge a complaint with the UN Security Council. That was done in January 1948 when India invoked Article 35 of the UN Charter. The text of India's complaint is recorded in the Security Council document of Jan. 2nd, January 1948. India's complaint said, "Since the aid which the invaders are receiving from Pakistan is an act of aggression against India, the government of India are entitled, in international law, to send their armed forces across Pakistan territory for dealing effectively with the invaders". The Government of India appealed to the Security Council to ask the Government of Pakistan:

To prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil, participating in or assisting the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir State;

To call upon other Pakistani nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir State;

To deny to the invaders access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir Military and other supplies all kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

To understand the scope for intervention in the affairs of J&K by the international community, provided by the UN, one must read Articles 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37 of the UN Charter together. India, as a member of the UN, availed of her right under Article 35 of the UN Charter to lodge a complaint against Pakistan for invading J&K with the malevolent intention of grabbing territory, which rightfully and legally belonged to India.

Another act of appeasement by Gandhi was Gandhi's "fast unto death" to force the Indian Government to pay 55 crore rupees to Pakistan, and to force the Hindu and Sikh refugees in Delhi to vacate the abandoned mosques and Muslim homes where they had found shelter (this was midwinter 1947-48, when the temperature close to freezing). But it could easily be seen that the real motive behind the fast was to compel the Dominion Government to pay the sum of Rs 55 crores to Pakistan, the payment of which was emphatically refused by the Government.