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Guadalajara : is 40 miles NE of Madrid. The Battle of Guadalajara took place between 8th & 23rd March 1937. It saw the People’s Republican Army (EPR) under the overall command of General José Miaja Menant stationed at Madrid, defeat the Fascist forces of Mussolini & Franco attempting to encircle Madrid during the Spanish Civil War. Though EPR had repulsed the third offensive of the Fascist forces on Madrid, its forces were defeated at the battle of the Jarama River, inspiring the Fascist supremo Franco to continue with a fourth offensive aimed at closing the pincer around Madrid. Franco’s chief ally Mussolini endorsed the operation & committed Italian units to it. The Italian commander planned to surround Madrid’s defences from the north-west. After joining Franco’s corps ‘Madrid’ on the Jarama River, he would execute the main assault on Madrid. Franco’s division ‘Soria’ was present but played no part in the first five days of fighting. The main attack on Madrid began in the 25 km-wide pass at Guadalajara-Alcalá de Henares. This region was well suited for an advance, as there were five roads of high quality running through it. Three other roads in the area led to Guadalajara, allowing for the possibility of capturing this town as well. Franco’s forces had 35,000 soldiers, 222 artillery pieces, 108 L3/33 & L3/35 tankettes, 32 armoured cars, 3,685 motor vehicles, & 60 Fiat CR.32 fighter planes. The Italian tankettes & armoured cars were organized as the Tank & Armoured Cars Group & the Italian aircraft were organized into the Legionary Air Force. No defensive works had been constructed in the Guadalajara region, because EPR’s Army Staff was sure that the next Fascist offensive would come from the south, & regarded the region as a peaceful part of the front. Hence EPR’s presence in that region consisted only of its 12th Division under Colonel Lacalle. He had under his command 10,000 soldiers with only 5,900 rifles, 85 machine guns, & 15 artillery pieces. One company of (Russian) T-26 light tanks were also sent to reinforce the 12th. The Fascist forces involved were primarily the Italian Corps of Volunteer Troops (CTV) which took Guadalajara on 8th & began moving rapidly towards Madrid. Four days later the Republican Army with Soviet tanks counter-attacked. This offensive was halted by 11 March. Between 12 March & 14 March, renewed Italian attacks were supported by Franco’s units. These were halted too. On 15 March, EPR prepared a counter-offensive which was launched on 18 March & had routed the Fascists by 23 March. The Battle of Guadalajara was an important strategic victory of the EPR. Herbert Matthews claimed in the New York Times that Guadalajara was “to Fascism what the defeat at Bailén had been to Napoleon”. The British press heaped scorn on this “new Caporetto” – alluding to a great Italian defeat in the First World War – while former British prime minister David Lloyd George wrote mockingly of the “Italian skedaddle,” infuriating Mussolini. The Italian CTV lost some 3,000 men (Franco’s losses were marginal) & a considerable number of light tanks. In addition, the EPR captured sizeable quantities of badly-needed materiel & equipment, including 35 artillery pieces, 85 machine guns, & 67 vehicles. Strategically, its victory prevented the encirclement of Madrid, ending Franco’s hopes of crushing the Republic with a decisive strike at its capital. Above all, Guadalajara was a setback to Italian morale & a loss of prestige for Italy’s fascist regime…. If Republican confidence soared, there was no corresponding loss of morale in Franco’s circles, which regarded the Italian expeditionary force with some contempt. German officers in Salamanca (q.v.) sneered that even “Jews” & “Communists” – as the International Brigades were stereotyped – could beat the Italians…. Franco’s soldiers began singing popular Italian tunes with lyrical changes mocking the defeated of CTV. The minimal success of the Italian offensive demonstrated the vulnerability of massed armoured advances in unfavourable terrain & against a coherent infantry defence. The French General Staff concluded that mechanized troops were not the decisive element of modern warfare & continued to shape their military doctrine accordingly. A notable exception to this view was Charles de Gaulle. The Germans escaped this conclusion by incorrectly dismissing the Guadalajara failure being the product of leadership & planning. In truth, both views had some merit: armoured forces were largely ineffective against prepared defences organized in depth; in adverse weather, & without proper air support, the result was disaster (Italian strategists failed to consider these variables). But the German assessment incorrectly noted the deficiencies in Italian weaponry, planning, & organization that contributed to their defeat at Guadalajara. In particular, their vehicles & tanks had lacked the technical quality & their leaders the determination necessary to effect the violent breakthroughs characteristic of later German blitzkrieg tactics. [Based on article on July2017, by Editors Ency. Britannica; Images of Revolution & War by Alexander Vergara, & other sources]